报告题目 | Endogenous Merger Decisions Among Competitors: Impact of Limited Capacity and Loyal Segments | ||
报告人（单位） | 戴悦（复旦大学） | ||
点评人（单位） | 刘新旺（东南大学） | 点评人（单位） | 丁溢（东南大学） |
时间地点 | 时间：2023年4月17日 下午4:00 地点：经管楼B201 | ||
报告内容摘要 | We study endogenous merger decisions among three competing firms with asymmetric capacity: One large firm has ample capacity, and two small firms have limited capacity. Each firm can either operate independently or merge with another firm. When two firms merge, the merged entity and the remaining independent firm use the resulting capacity to capture their own “loyal buyers” and compete in price for price-sensitive “disloyal switchers”. We first consider a base model where the size of loyal buyers for different firms is symmetric. We find that either there is no merger or the large firm will merge with a small firm (called mixed merger). We explain how the equilibrium structure is driven by the “price effect” and the “demand effect”. Specifically, the mixed merger which can most effectively reduce price competition is the equilibrium for relatively competitive market conditions (i.e., small size of loyal buyers and large but constrained capacity). We also extend to the case with asymmetric size of loyal segments, and show that two small firms merging can be the equilibrium structure when the large firm has a much larger loyal segment than the small firms and the small firms’ capacity is sufficiently large. | ||
报告人简介：
戴悦，复旦大学管理学院管理科学系教授。主要研究方向为供应链管理,博弈论等，目前关注市场营销和供应链管理的交互研究。研究成果发表于Marketing Science，MSOM， POM等国际期刊上。研究课题包括国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金项目，教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”，及多项国际课题。负责讲授各个层次的供应链管理和运营管理课程。 | |||
