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学术前沿讲座——Auction-based e-waste recycling with dual responsibilities

发布时间:2022-10-10访问量:212



报告题目

Auction-based e-waste recycling with dual responsibilities

(政府-企业双重责任下城乡电子垃圾回收拍卖机制研究)

报告人(单位)

徐素秀 教授(北京理工大学)

主持人(单位)

李泳臻(东南大学)

会议时间

2022101215:00

会议地点

腾讯会议ID107-246-305  密码:2022

点击链接入会:https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/JLMHHKyAkdD1

特别提醒:请参会者以真名进入,否则可能会被移出会议!

报告人简介

徐素秀,北京理工大学管理与经济学院教授、博导、特立青年学者。2008年哈尔滨工业大学数学系获理学学士学位,2014年香港大学工业及制造系统工程系获哲学博士学位。任中国管理科学与工程学会交通运输管理分会委员,SSCI期刊RAE-Journal of Business Management副编辑,Journal of Intelligent ManufacturingJournal of Advanced TransportationSCI期刊客座编辑。研究兴趣包括交通经济学、拍卖与机制设计、博弈与供应链管理、优化理论与算法等。主持2项国家自然科学基金项目(青年、面上),入选2017年广东省“珠江人才计划”青年拔尖人才。出版著作1部,发明专利受理实审4项,一共发表SCI/SSCI论文40多篇,其中以第一作者或通讯作者在相关领域国际顶级期刊发表SCI/SSCI论文13篇:Transportation Research Part B(七篇),Transportation Science(一篇,INFORMS期刊),Production and Operations Management(一篇,UTD24期刊),IISE Transactions(三篇,IISE旗舰期刊),Ecological Economics(一篇,ISEE旗舰期刊)。近年来,谷歌学术累计引用近千次,研究成果获IISE Transactions期刊年度最佳论文奖、2016 IISE Asia国际会议最佳论文奖、及2021 IEEE IEEM国际会议最佳论文奖。

报告内容提要

摘要:The efficient recycling of electric and electronic waste products (e-waste) not only provides environmental and societal benefits but also is recognized as being profitable from economic and business perspectives. However, how to design incentive mechanisms for efficient e-waste recycling with dual responsibilities, namely, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and government poverty alleviation, remains unclear. In this paper, we consider an e-waste recycling problem in which a company collects a certain amount of e-waste from developed and poor regions. With the goal of CSR, the company implements its e-waste recycling plan in the two regions sequentially to improve the benefits for the poor region. We introduce the concept of the price of CSR, which is defined as the loss of social welfare. We find a U-shaped relation between the price of CSR and realized demand in the poor region. We propose a family of novel Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions with CSR and government subsidies. Interestingly, if the bid-ask spread is large enough in the developed region, then the company with CSR obtains higher profits. The outcome of e-waste recycling is used as a signal for the precise allocation of the budget for government subsidies. The targeted poverty alleviation schemes are incentive-compatible (IC) and can ensure that a “poorer” agent or village receives a higher subsidy. This paper enriches the existing auction theory, and provides insights into the impacts of firm-level action (CSR), government policy (subsidies), and individual behavior on poverty alleviation.


电子垃圾的有效回收不仅能提升环境和社会效益,而且在经济和商业上也是有利可图的。然而,如何将企业社会责任(CSR)和政府扶贫/乡村振兴(即,双重责任)纳入电子垃圾回收的激励机制尚不明确。考虑一个城乡电子垃圾回收问题:一家公司需从发达地区和相对贫困/欠发达地区回收一定数量的电子垃圾。公司以CSR为目标,在两个地区顺序地实施电子垃圾回收计划,提高贫困地区的社会福利。提出企业社会责任价格(Price of CSR)的概念,将其定义为社会福利的损失。研究发现:企业社会责任价格与在贫困地区所实现的需求呈U型关系。进而提出一类考虑企业社会责任和政府补贴的新型VCG拍卖机制。有趣的是,如果发达地区的买卖价差足够大,那么以CSR为目标的公司将会获得更高的利润。电子垃圾回收的结果可以被政府用作制定精准扶贫/乡村振兴方案的一个有用信号。该政府精准扶贫/乡村振兴方案满足激励相容(IC),可以确保“更贫穷”的个体或村庄获得更高的补贴。本研究丰富了现有的拍卖理论,深入分析了企业层面的行为(CSR)、政府政策(补贴)和个人行为对扶贫/乡村振兴的影响。



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