报告题目 | Price Delegation or Not ? The Effect of Heterogeneous Sales Agents | |
报告人（单位） | 陈剑 教授（清华大学） | |
主持人（单位） | 薛巍立（东南大学） | |
时间地点 | 时间：2020年12月 16 日（周三 ）下午14 点 腾讯会议ID：442 153 788 | |
报告内容摘要 | In this study, we examine the effect of the differences in both sales ability and reservation utility on the design of the pricing scheme and compensation contract under asymmetric information. Heterogeneity with ability-dependent reservation utility generates conflicted screening and pooling effects that preclude separating and pooling equilibria, respectively; with which agents may work harder under either centralized or delegated pricing scheme than if they were homogeneous and, in certain scenarios, no premiums (information rents) are paid. These findings are driven by the dynamics between the differences in agents’ reservation utilities and in their effort costs or rewards that arise when their true types are concealed. We show that optimal separating contracts generate the same profit under centralized and delegated pricing because separating contracts under centralization retain the pricing flexibility of delegation. However, a certain form of pooling contract under delegated pricing can outperform the optimal pooling contract under centralization because the upside of pricing flexibility under delegation dominates the downside caused by reduced effort incentives. Under the optimal contracts, delegated pricing is as profitable to the firm as centralized pricing when the difference of reservation utilities is small or when the difference is large but the ability gap is small; and delegation is preferred when the difference of reservation utilities is moderate or when that difference and the ability gap are large. Joint work with He HUANG, Hongyan XU and Liming LIU | |
报告人简介：陈剑现任清华大学ky体育官方平台中国官方网站联想讲席教授。主要研究方向：供应链管理、电子商务、商务智能等。主持五十多个国家自然科学基金委、教育部、863等国家部委项目，以及地方政府/企业委托项目；在国际国内学术期刊上发表论文二百多篇；应邀在多个国际会议上做大会报告（Keynote/Plenary Lecture）。2008年被选为国际电气和电子工程师协会会士。 | ||
