报告题目 | Maintenance service strategy for leased equipment: integrating lessor-preventive maintenance and lessee-careful maintenance efforts | ||
报告人（单位） | 刘碧玉 副教授（福州大学） | ||
点评人（单位） | 陈伟达 教授（东南大学） | ||
在线会议信息 | 2020年12月17日下午2：00； 腾讯会议ID：354 193 668；入会密码：1217 | ||
报告人简介 | |||
刘碧玉，福州大学经济与管理学院物流系副教授，博士生导师，Luleå University of Technology联合培养博士、访问学者，浙江大学博士后，教育部物流管理与工程专业青年工作组成员、中国物流学会理事、国际生产与运作管理学会（POMS）会员、国家自然科学基金通讯评审人；IISE、IJPR、IJPE、JCP、ITOR、《管理科学学报》和《系统工程理论与实践》等期刊审稿人。近年来主要集中研究废旧产品回收再制造决策、可持续闭环供应链运作决策、碳排放政策优化和租赁服务供应链运营决策等亟待解决的社会现实问题，主持国家自然科学基金项目2项，中国博士后科学基金、福建省社科规划重大项目、福建省自然科学基金面上项目等省部级课题8项，其他各类项目多项；相关研究成果发表在《International Journal of Production Research》《Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment》《International Transactions in Operational Research》《International Journal of Production Economics》《Journal of Cleaner Production》《Computers & Industrial Engineering》《管理科学学报》和《中国管理科学》等本学科主流期刊上，在Springer和科学出版社合作出版学术专著各1部，在机械工业出版社合作出版《全球采购与供应管理》教材1部；获江苏高校哲学社会科学优秀成果二等奖，福建省哲学社会科学优秀成果奖青年佳作奖；入选“福建省高校新世纪优秀人才计划”，“福建省高校杰出青年科研人才计划”和“福州大学旗山学者奖励计划”。 | |||
报告内容提要 | |||
Lessees may abuse equipment during the lease period since they do not own it, thereby increasing lessors’ repair cost and lessees’ downtime losses. This study integrates lessees’ effort to maintain leased equipment carefully during the lease period into maintenance service strategies while considering lessors’ preventive maintenance (PM) on the equipment. Neither party achieves the cooperative game’s ideal revenue in a non-cooperative game, but improvement in the lessee’s effort level and lessor’s PM degree can increase the other party’s revenue. A cost-sharing contract model is designed to achieve the maximum revenue as in a cooperative game and ensure Pareto improvement of the leasing parties. Here, the lessor grants the lessee a rental discount, and the lessor’s PM cost and lessee’s effort cost are shared with cost-sharing coefficients. Conditions under which the ideal revenue and Pareto improvement can be achieved are discussed. Numerical examples illustrate the effects of contract parameters, unit penalty on the effort level, and revenue. Finally, managerial insights are provided for leasing parties. The results show: the effect of the effort level and PM degree on equipment failures is marginally diminishing; proposed cost-sharing contract model can achieve the ideal revenue and Pareto improvement; adjusting the rental discount has a greater impact on the lessee, while the cost-sharing coefficients have a greater impact on the lessor; and increasing the unit penalty decreases (increases) the lessor’s (lessee’s) revenue but maintains the effort level at constant. | |||
